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The Adequacy of Speculation in Agricultural Futures Markets: 




Long-only commodity index funds have been blamed by other futures market participants for 
inflating commodity prices, increasing market volatility, and distorting historical price 
relationships.  Much of this criticism is leveled without any formal empirical support or even 
cursory data analyses.  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission makes available the positions 
held by index funds and other large traders in their Commitment’s of Traders report.  In this 
research, we make an initial assessment of the size and activity of index funds in traditional 
agricultural futures markets.  The results suggest that after an initial surge from early 2004 through 
mid-2005, index fund positions have stabilized as a percent of total open interest.  Speculative 
measures—such as Working’s T—suggest that long-only funds may provide a benefit in markets 
traditionally dominated by short hedging.    
 





In a series of classic papers, Working (1953 1954 1960 1962) argued that futures markets are 
primarily hedging markets and that speculators tend to follow hedging volume and liquidity.  If this 
assertion is true, then a key performance indicator in futures markets is the level of speculation 
relative to hedging.  Working termed this “the market balance concept.”  A common concern 
expressed in writings on agricultural futures markets over the following two decades was that 
speculation on futures markets was not large enough to accommodate hedging pressure (e.g., 
Hieronymus 1971; Peck 1980; Leuthold 1983).  In today’s world of managed futures, hedge funds, 
and long-only commodity index investments, that concern seems more than a little dated.  Indeed, 
many would argue that today’s speculative trade in agricultural futures markets is the proverbial tail 
wagging the dog.  For example, recent growth in long-only commodity index funds has led some 
market participants to claim that excessive speculation is creating “price distortions” and potentially 
disrupting traditional cash-futures convergence patterns (Morrison 2006; Henriques 2008)  
 
The nature and structure of agricultural futures markets has changed dramatically since the 
pioneering research of Working.  The days of the dentist-speculator from Dubuque dabbling in the 
pork bellies futures market are long gone.  Fueled by academic evidence showing that commodity 
futures portfolios can generate returns comparable to equities (e.g., Gorton and Rouwenhorst 2006), 
the investment industry has developed products that allow individuals and institutions to “invest” in 
commodities through over-the-counter swaps and structured notes that are linked to popular 
commodity indices, such as the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (Acworth 2005).  Domanski and 
Heath (2007) term this the “financialisation” of commodity markets. 
 
The conventional method of monitoring speculative positions in futures markets is through the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) Commitments of Traders (COT) reports.    2
Working (1960) defined a speculative index to measure the adequacy of non-commercial positions 
to essentially off-set the hedging positions held by commercial traders.  Working’s speculative 
index has been used in several studies to examine grain and livestock futures markets for adequate 
speculative activity (Working 1960; Nathan Associates 1967; Labys and Granger 1970; Peck 1982; 
Leuthold 1983).  Generally, these academic studies concluded that speculation in agricultural 
futures markets was not excessive.  For example, Peck found that “…wheat, corn, and soybean 
markets are characterized by very low relative levels of speculation” (p. 1040) and Leuthold found 
no “…evidence to indicate that the levels of speculation in livestock have led to increased price 
variability as often alleged in the popular press” (p. 133).  Now, over 25 years later, allegations 
about the size and impact of speculators in commodity markets have once again arisen within 
industry (Sjerven 2008), government (CHSGA 2008), and the academy (AFPC 2008).  Clearly, 
additional research efforts are needed to better understand the role and potential impact of 
speculators in general and long-only funds in particular.   
 
The objective of this paper is to re-visit the “adequacy of speculation” debate in agricultural futures 
markets, bringing new data to the task.  Specifically, COT data—including positions held by long-
only index funds and commercial banks as reported in the Commodity Index Trader (CIT) report—
will be closely examined to better measure the nature of speculation in grain and livestock futures 
markets.  The first part of the analysis will provide an overview of the relative trading activity of 
commercial, non-commercial, and non-reporting traders.  Particular attention will be given to recent 
trends indicative of a shift in speculative activity, perhaps associated with the growth in long-only 
commodity funds.  The second part of the analysis will use Working’s speculative index to examine 
the “adequacy” of speculation relative to hedging demands in agricultural futures markets since the 
mid-1990s.  The third part focuses on a separate CFTC report—Banker Participation in Futures 
Markets—to provide a unique look at the increase in long-only index activity.  The focus will be on 
summarizing the data and highlighting recent trends to provide a more objective assessment of 




Traditional COT Report 
 
The traditional COT report provides a breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest for markets in 
which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to or above the reporting levels established by the 
CFTC.
1  Note that open interest for a given market is aggregated across all contract expiration 
months.  The weekly reports for Futures-and-Options-Combined Commitments of Traders are 
released every Friday at 3:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. 
 
Reports are available in both a short and long format.  The short report shows open interest 
separately by reportable and non-reportable positions. For reportable positions, additional data are 
provided for commercial and non-commercial holdings, spreading, changes from the previous 
report, percentage of open interest by category, and number of traders.  The long report, in addition 
to the information in the short report, also groups the data by crop year, where appropriate, and 
shows the concentration of positions held by the largest four and eight traders.   
   3
Using the information in the short report, non-commercial open interest is divided into long, short, 
and spreading; whereas, commercial and non-reporting open interest is simply divided into long or 
short.  The following relation explains how the market’s total open interest (TOI) is disaggregated: 
 
(1)   ) ( 2 ] [ ] [ )] ( 2 [
Reporting Non Reporting
TOI NRS NRL CS CL NCSP NCS NCL = + + + + + +
−
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where, NCL, NCS, and NCSP are non-commercial long, short, and spreading positions, 
respectively. CL (CS) represents commercial long (short) positions, and NRL (NRS) are long 
(short) positions held by non-reporting traders.  Reporting and non-reporting positions must sum to 
the market’s total open interest (TOI), and the number of longs must equal the number of short 
positions.  
 
A frequent complaint about the traditional COT data is that the trader designations may be 
somewhat muddled (e.g., Ederington and Lee 2002).  For speculators, there may be an incentive to 
self-classify their activity as commercial hedging to circumvent speculative position limits.  In 
contrast, there is little incentive for traders to desire the non-commercial designation.  So, it is often 
thought that the non-commercial category is a relatively pure subset of reporting speculators 
(Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo 2004).  The available evidence about the composition of non-
reporting traders is dated (Working 1960; Larson 1961; Rutledge 1977-78; Peck 1982), so little is 
known about this group other than their position size is less than reporting levels.    
 
While there may be some incentive for reporting traders to desire the commercial designation, the 
CFTC implements a fairly rigorous process—including statements of cash positions in the 
underlying commodity—to ensure that commercial traders have an underlying risk associated with 
their futures positions.  However, in recent years industry participants began to suspect that these 
data were “contaminated” because the underlying risk for many reporting commercials were not 
positions in the actual physical commodity (CFTC 2006a 2006b).  Rather, the reporting 
commercials were banks and other swap dealers hedging risk associated with over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivative positions.  
 
For example, a commercial bank may take the opposite side of a long commodity swap position 
desired by a customer.
2  The commercial bank, not wanting the market risk, will then buy 
commodity futures contracts to mitigate their market exposure associated with the swap position.  
Technically, the bank’s position is a bona fide hedge against an underlying risk in the swap market.  
Yet, the bank is clearly not a commercial hedger in the traditional sense.  Indeed, the third party or 
bank customer who initiated the position may be hedging or speculating; their motives are not 
necessarily known even to the swap dealer.  However, the OTC swap positions that can be easily 
identified are those “…seeking exposure to a broad index of commodity prices as an asset class in 
an unleveraged and passively-managed manner” (CFTC 2008).  In this instance, the bank customer 
is essentially long a commodity index such as the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) via a 
swap with the bank.  The bank then mitigates their long GSCI exposure by hedging each 
commodity component (e.g., crude oil, corn, and live cattle) in the respective individual futures 
markets.  Because the banks and swap dealers can easily identify swaps associated with commodity 
indices, it allows the CFTC to further segregate the reporting trader categories to include “index 
traders.”   4
Commodity Index Traders (CIT) Report 
 
Starting in 2007—in response to complaints by traditional traders about the rapid increase in long-
only index money flowing into the markets—the CFTC released supplemental reports which break 
out the positions of index traders for 12 agricultural markets.  According to the CFTC, the index 
trader positions reflect both pension funds that would have previously been classified as non-
commercials as well as swap dealers who would have previously been classified as commercials 
hedging OTC transactions involving commodity indices. 
 
The CFTC readily admits that this classification procedure has flaws and that “…some traders 
assigned to the Index Traders category are engaged in other futures activity that could not be 
disaggregated….Likewise, the Index Traders category will not include some traders who are 
engaged in index trading, but for whom it does not represent a substantial part of their overall 
trading activity” (CFTC 2008).  Regardless, the data are an improvement over the more heavily 
aggregated traditional COT classifications, and they should provide some new insights as to trader 
activity. 
 
The CIT data are released in conjunction with the traditional COT report showing combined futures 
and options positions.  The index trader positions are simply removed from their prior categories 
and presented as a new category of reporting traders.  The CIT data includes the long and short 
positions held by commercials (less index traders), non-commercials (less index traders), index 
traders, and non-reporting traders.   
 
While the data for the traditional COT trader positions are available for each week from March 21, 
1995 through April 15, 2008 (683 observations), the CIT data are only available for the period 
covering January 3, 2006 through April 15, 2008 (120 observations).  Both reports reflect combined 
futures and options positions, where options are adjusted to the delta-equivalent futures position.  
The reports show traders’ holdings as of Tuesday’s market close. 
 
Bank Participation (BP) Data 
 
Well before there were concerns about long-only index funds, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
desired to monitor the participation of commercial banks in futures markets (Huhman 2006).  In 
response, the CFTC compiled the Bank Participation in Futures Markets report (BP).  The BP 
report contains the positions held by commercial banks in futures markets where there are at least 
five banks with open positions.  A Bank Participation in Options Markets report is also compiled, 
but it does not adjust positions to a delta-equivalent basis, reducing its usefulness. The BP reports 
are released monthly on a reporting date that is aligned with the COT reports.  However, the BP 
reports are independent and they are not technically part of the COT reports. 
 
The BP report started to sporadically show positions in the grain markets by mid-2003, indicating 
that at least five commercial banks were participating in the grain futures markets during some 
months in that year.  By late 2004, there are consistent data available for the primary grain markets 
representing on-going participation by at least five commercial banks each month.  Consistent 
participation by commercial banks in the livestock futures markets began in mid-to-late-2005. 
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Importantly, positions shown in the BP report are a pure subset of the traditional COT commercial 
category.  Moreover, it is generally thought that the commercial bank positions are mostly hedges 
against OTC swaps on commodity indices (Huhman 2006).  In which case, there should be a strong 
correspondence between BP data and the CIT data.  Because the BP data actually have a longer 
available history than the CIT data, the BP data will be used to supplement the analysis of index 
trader positions for certain markets. 
 
Summary Statistics and Trends 
 
In this section the summary statistics and trends are presented for various measures of market 
participation and activity.  When possible, the entire data set from 1995 forward is used.  However, 
in many instances, the focus is on the period from January 2006 through April 2008 for which the 
CIT data are available.  Markets included in the analysis are as follows: corn, soybeans, soybean oil, 
CBOT wheat, KCBOT wheat, cotton, live cattle, feeder cattle, and lean hogs.
3 
 
Changes in Activity 
 
Agricultural futures markets experienced rapid growth starting in late 2004.  The open interest for 
many agricultural futures markets doubled or even tripled from late 2004 through 2006.  For 
example, the CBOT wheat futures market saw open interest increase 275% from June 2004 to June 
2006 (see Figure 1).  Other markets, such as soybeans, have continued to see rapid growth in open 
interest into 2008 (see Figure 2). The increase in open interest may be attributed to electronic 
trading and easier market access, an inflationary environment for many commodity markets, or 
potentially an increase in the use of commodity futures as an investment tool and inflation hedge. 
 
Using the data from the traditional COT report, the positions of the trader groups—as measured by 
their percent of total open interest—are examined for the 1995-2005 and 2006-2008 periods.  As 
shown in Table 1, uniformly across all markets, the relative size of non-reporting traders has 
declined.  For example, non-reporting traders in CBOT wheat comprised, on average, 22% of the 
open interest from 1995-2005, but only 10% of the open interest from 2006-2008.  On the flipside, 
non-commercials increased their share of the open interest in every market, and the commercials’ 
share of the open interest increased in all but three markets (KCBOT wheat, soybeans, and cotton).  
The specific trends by COT category for CBOT wheat are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Clearly, the agricultural futures markets have changed since 2004.  First, the total level of open 
interest has increased markedly.  Second, the role of smaller (non-reporting) traders has diminished, 
while there has been a relative increase in market positions held by reporting traders—especially in 
the commercial category.  In the next section, we use the CIT data to gain further insights into the 
market composition. 
 
Index Trader Participation 
 
The sample period from January 2006 through April 2008 is available for analyzing the CIT data.  
The CIT data are first compared to the original COT classifications to determine from which 
traditional COT category the index positions are extracted.  The results are shown in Table 2. 
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As expected, index trader positions were primarily aggregated within the commercial long 
positions.  Across markets, roughly 85% of the index trader positions were previously contained in 
the long commercial category of the traditional COT reports.  The other 15% is primarily from the 
long non-commercial category.  This suggests that the majority of long-only commodity index 
positions are initially established in the OTC markets, then the underlying position is transmitted to 
the futures market by the swap dealers (including both commercial and investment banks) hedging 
their OTC exposure.   
 
One of the primary concerns expressed by the industry is the magnitude of the commodity index 
activity.  In a recent Barron’s article, one analyst quipped that “index funds account for 40% of all 
bullish bets on commodities…the index funds hold about $211 billion worth of bets on the buy side 
of U.S. markets.” (Epstein 2008).  Presumably, the sheer size of the index fund positions may allow 
them to distort prices or price relationships across markets.   
 
A detailed view of position size as a percent of total open interest is provided in Table 3.  Over the 
sample period, index traders do make up a surprisingly large portion of certain markets.  In 
particular, index traders are over 20% of the open interest in live cattle, lean hogs and CBOT wheat.  
In all other markets, index trader positions tend to be between 10% and 15%.  While this is not an 
insignificant share of the open interest, in no market is the index share larger than either the non-
commercial or commercial categories.  Rather, the index share of open interest tends to be closer to 
that of the non-reporting traders.   
 
Importantly, the data show that index traders’ percent of total open interest has been relatively 
stable over the sample period.  This is demonstrated for CBOT wheat in Figure 4, where the index 
traders’ share of the market has fluctuated in a fairly narrow range between 20% and 25% over the 
last two years.  As shown in Figure 5, the same is true for both corn and soybeans, where the index 
funds percent of open interest has not exceeded 15% since 2006.  Similarly, the livestock futures 
markets (Figure 6) show that as a percent of total open interest, index fund positions have been 
relatively stable over the sample period.  The exception seems to be live cattle which trended higher 
in mid-2007 and then stabilized around 23%.   
 
An additional criticism of index funds is their disproportionate presence on the long side of the 
market, stemming from the fact they are “long-only.”  To examine this idea more closely, we first 
examine the percent net long position held by each trader category in the CIT data.  The percent net 
long position is simply defined by trader category as the net position (long positions minus the short 
positions) divided by the total positions held (see Sanders, Manfredo, and Boris).  For example, a 
long position of 1,000 and a short position of 2,000 would yield a percent net long of -33% ((1,000-
2000)/3000), indicating that the net position held by that trader category is 33% short. 
 
The percent net long for each trader group is calculated over the sample period and presented in 
Table 4.  As expected, index traders are 90%-98% net long in each market.  Likewise, the 
commercial category is 20%-65% net short reflecting the traditional short hedging of producers, 
commercial processors, first handlers, and warehouses.  Interestingly, for two of the markets with 
high levels of index participation—CBOT wheat and lean hogs—the index funds are the only 
category that held a net long position over the sample period.   
   7
To more closely examine each side of the market, the relative size of the long and short side of the 
markets is presented in Table 5 for each trader category.  Since index funds are almost exclusively 
long, their percent of the market roughly doubles when only considering the long side of the market 
as opposed to total positions.  For example, index funds are 21% of the total positions in CBOT 
wheat, but they are 40% of the long positions in CBOT wheat.  Across the markets, index funds 
range from 20% (KCBOT wheat) to 44% (lean hogs) of the long positions in the market.  In both 
CBOT wheat and lean hogs, the index funds held a larger portion of long positions than any other 
trader group.  With the exception of feeder cattle, the short-side of the market is mostly dominated 
by commercial hedgers.    
 
The CIT data clearly show that index funds are a large portion of the open interest in some 
agricultural commodity markets.  In lean hogs and CBOT wheat, the index funds tend to be the 
largest category on the long-side of the market.  While this attests to the sheer size of their market 
participation, it does not necessarily imply that they have a price impact. 
 
Traders and Position Size 
 
The CIT data (as well as the COT data) include information on the number of reporting traders in 
each category.  From this, we can determine the number of reporting index traders in each market as 
well as the average trader’s position size relative to the other trader categories. 
 
Table 6 shows the average number of reporting traders over the sample period from January, 2006 
to April, 2008.  The total number of reporting traders for the market is shown as well as the number 
in each trader category.  A reporting trader can appear in more than one category; therefore, the sum 
of each category need not equal the total reporting traders in that market.   
 
From the data in Table 6, it is immediately apparent that there are relatively few reporting index 
traders.  The corn, CBOT wheat, and soybean futures markets have 24 long index traders with 
reportable positions, while the KCBOT wheat futures market has 15 reporting long index traders.  
There are a few index traders with short positions, but these most likely reflect some of the 
positions held by long index traders that the CFTC could not disaggregate.  Across most of the 
markets, there does not seem to be any glaring disparities between the number of reporting 
commercial and non-commercial traders.   
 
Table 7 shows the average reporting trader’s position size by category over the sample period.  The 
average position size is simply calculated as the positions held by that category divided by the 
number of reporting traders in that category.  Because a trader may appear in more than one 
category, the calculated average position size is likely lower than the actual.   
 
Not surprisingly, given the fairly large percent of open positions held by index traders (Table 3) and 
the relatively few number of reporting index traders (Table 7), the average index trader’s position 
size is relatively large.  For example, in the corn futures market, the average long index trader has a 
position of 16,805 contracts which is more than 10 times the size of the average long position held 
by either commercials or non-commercials.  This finding is consistent: long index traders have the 
largest average position size.   
   8
For comparison, Table 7 also shows the reporting levels and speculative limits for each market.  
Clearly, the average position size of all reporting trader categories is larger than the required 
reporting level.  However, the average position size held by non-commercials generally falls far 
short of the speculative limits.  This suggests that among non-commercial reporting traders there is 
likely a wide variation in position sizes, where some non-commercial positions must approach the 
speculative limits.   
 
Commercial traders who are bona fide hedgers are not subject to the positions limits.  Yet, in no 
market does the average position size held within the commercial category exceed the speculative 
limit.  However, the index traders—who most likely are categorized as commercial hedgers in the 
original COT data—come much closer to the speculative limits on average.  In fact, the average 
long index trader in CBOT wheat holds more than 2,000 contracts in excess of the speculative limit 
of 6,500.  While this is legal, it does provide some indirect evidence that speculators or investors are 
able to use OTC instruments and commercial hedge exemptions to surpass speculative position 
limits. 
 
Based on the information in Tables 6 and 7, it is clear that index traders number relatively few; but, 
they hold very large long positions.  The average position size for an index trader can be more than 
10 times the size of the average position held by other trader groups.  Since index funds are long-
only and not known for rapid-fire trading, it is not clear that this presents a problem.  Although, it 
does support the notion that when the index funds “roll” positions to a new contract month it is a 




Working (1960) developed his speculative “T” index to measure the amount of speculation to 
“carry” hedging after accounting for the amount of long and short hedging that offset each other.  
Working’s speculative index has been used in several studies to examine grain and livestock futures 
markets for adequate speculative activity (Working 1960; Nathan Associates 1967; Labys and 
Granger 1970; Peck 1982; Leuthold 1983).  Nearly all prior research is concerned about a lack of 
sufficient speculative activity to support hedging demands in the marketplace.  While this notion 
seems at odds with the current market environment, Working’s T still provides an objective 
measure of speculative activity. 
 
Working’s T is easily calculated using the traditional COT trader categories: 
 
 
(2a)      T = 1+ SS / (HL + HS)  if (HS ≥ HL) 
 
   o r  
 
(2b)      T = 1 + SL / (HL + HS)  if (HL > HS)  
 
where open interest held by speculators (non-commercials) and hedgers (commercials) is denoted as 
follows,   
   9
      SS = Speculation, Short    SL = Speculation, Long 
      HL = Hedging, Long      HS = Hedging, Short  
 
As an example of the calculation and interpretation of Working’s speculative T index, consider the 
intuitive case where HL=0; then, T= SL/HS = 1+ (SS/HS).
4  It follows, if long speculation (SL) just 
equals short hedging (HS), then T equals its minimum value of 1.00, where the level of speculation 
is just sufficient to off-set hedging needs.  Now, consider if HL=0, SS=10, HS=100, SL=110, then T 
equals 1.10 or there is 10% speculation in excess of that necessary to meet hedging needs.  Working 
is careful to point out that what may be “technically an ‘excess’ of speculation is economically 
necessary” for a well-functioning market (1960 p. 197). 
 
As noted by several authors (e.g., Leuthold 1983), Working’s T suffers from the problem of how to 
classify the non-reporting traders.  Non-reporting traders can be classified as speculators, creating 
an upper bound on the speculative index.  Or, they can be classified as hedgers, creating a lower 
bound on the index.  With either of these approaches however, the index will be impacted through 
time if the proportion of non-reporting traders in a market changes.  As shown in Table 1 and Figure 
3, diminishing levels of non-reporting trader positions is clearly a problem over our sample period.  
So, we follow the advice of Rutledge (1977-78) and initially allocate the non-reporting traders’ 
positions to the commercial, non-commercial, and index trader categories in the same proportion as 
that which is observed for reporting traders. 
 
Working’s T is calculated for a number of sub-periods using the traditional COT data.  For the later 
sample in which CIT data are available, Working’s T is calculated using both the traditional COT 
categories and the CIT data.  When using the CIT data, the index traders are re-grouped with the 
non-commercial traders.  That is, the index trader positions are considered speculative. 
 
The values for Working’s T are presented in Table 8. The speculative indices reported do not seem 
extraordinarily high in any sub-period from 1995 through 2008 using the traditional COT data.  
Corn futures average 1.08 which suggests that there is only 8% more speculation than the minimum 
needed to offset hedging needs.  The highest speculative index within the grains is CBOT wheat at 
1.15, and for livestock it is 1.38 recorded for feeder cattle.  Average index values across the nine 
markets range from 1.12 to 1.14 for the different sub-periods, implying that speculation was barely 
large enough to balance short hedging demands. In addition, there is no discernable trend in the 
indexes across the different sub-periods.  This is demonstrated in more detail in Figure 7 using the 
traditional COT trader classifications for CBOT wheat. 
 
In the last column of Table 8, Working’s T is re-calculated for the 2006-2008 sample period by re-
classifying index traders as speculators.  Because commercial hedgers are predominantly net short 
in each market, they require long speculators to “carry” their hedging.  So, by re-categorizing the 
long-only index funds into the non-commercial category, Working’s T essentially is shifted upward 
in each market.  Even with this adjustment, the average speculative index for the nine markets only 
increases from 1.14 to 1.27. The largest increase, from 1.38 to 1.67, occurs in feeder cattle.  
 
Further perspective is provided by comparing Working’s speculative index in recent periods with 
those reported by other researchers for earlier periods.  Table 9 presents the historical estimates 
from four previous studies (Working 1960; Labys and Granger 1970; Peck 1982; Leuthold 1983)   10
along with the upper and lower bounds for the CIT adjusted data from 2006-2008.
5  The upper 
(lower) range results from assuming that non-reporting traders are speculators (hedgers).
6  Non-
reporting traders are a proportionately smaller part of the market than they have been historically 
(see Table 1), resulting in a smaller range of “T” values than recorded in previous work.  Therefore, 
the calculation of Working’s T in recent years is not particularly sensitive to the speculator or 
hedger classification imposed on non-reporting traders.  The exception is feeder cattle, where non-
reporting traders still represent over 30% of the total open interest.  
 
Comparing the historical estimates in Table 9 with our results using the traditional COT in Table 8, 
one is struck by the relatively low levels of speculation throughout 1995-2008.  The average values 
for the speculative indices range from 1.12 to 1.14 across the different sub-periods, about equal to 
or smaller than the averages from the historical estimates spanning the late 1940s to the late 1970s, 
with the exception of Leuthold’s upper bound estimates in livestock futures markets.  As noted 
earlier, a common concern expressed in previous studies was that speculation on futures markets 
was not large enough to accommodate hedging pressure.  The results for 1995-2008 are wholly 
consistent with this historical concern regarding agricultural futures markets.  Peck’s (1980) 
conclusions are especially relevant in this regard.  For example, she was concerned about the 
inadequacy of speculation in CBOT wheat from 1972-1977 after finding a speculative index 
ranging from 1.094 to 1.323.  Peck viewed this level of speculation as inadequate when compared to 
an index of 1.355 to 1.891 from 1947-1971, a period that “would hardly be characterized as 
speculative” (p. 1041).   Likewise, Peck (1980) reports KCBOT wheat had a speculative index 
ranging from 1.009 to 1.045 which was “manifestly inadequate” (p. 1043).  Across the sub-periods 
over 1995-2008, CBOT wheat had an average speculative index of 1.14 and KCBOT wheat 
averaged 1.07.   
 
The final column of Table 9 shows upper and lower bounds for Working’s T over 2006-2008 using 
the CIT adjusted data.  Again, there is little evidence that current index levels are deviating from 
historical norms, even after accounting for index trader positions.  For instance, the range reported 
for live cattle futures (1.13-1.60) is generally lower than those reported by Peck (1.568-2.173) and 
Leuthold (1.05-2.34).  Interestingly, the values reported for cotton (1.27) and soybean oil (1.14) by 
Working for the 1954-1958 period are generally at the upper end of the recent range reported for 
2006-2008.  There is no pervasive evidence that current speculative levels, even after accounting for 
index trader positions, are in excess of those recorded historically for agricultural futures markets. 
 
Based on Working’s speculative T index, it would seem that agricultural futures markets do not 
have a historically high level of speculative activity.  However, in Working’s day, a commercial 
trader was most probably merchandising the underlying physical commodity, not hedging OTC 
swaps.  The current “commercial” category may still be contaminated by swap dealers who are 
hedging OTC swaps not used for commodity index investments.  Moreover, Working and others 
strongly maintained that futures markets were hedging markets, where speculators enter the market 
in response to hedging pressures.  The “financialization” of commodity markets opens this basic 
tenant to debate and may bring into question the appropriateness of traditional speculative 
measures.  
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Bank Participation (BP) 
 
In a monthly report separate from the COT and CIT reports, the CFTC reveals the participation of 
commercial banks in the commodity futures markets.  There must be at least five commercial banks 
participating in the market on the “as of” date for that market to be included in the Bank 
Participation in Futures Markets (BP) report.  Most agricultural futures market begin to show up 
sporadically in the monthly BP reports in 2003 and then more consistently from 2005 forward.  It is 
generally thought that the bank participation reflects hedging OTC commodity index swaps.  So, to 
facilitate comparison to the CIT data, the BP summary statistics are calculated over the same sub-
sample from January 2006 through April 2008. 
 
As shown in Table 10, the average number of banks participating in the agricultural commodity 
markets ranges from the minimum reporting level of  5 in feeder cattle to 14 in CBOT wheat.  
However, much like the CIT, the banks have a surprisingly large portion of open interest, holding 
9% of the futures-only open interest in CBOT wheat.  Likewise, the banks individually hold very 
large long positions.  For instance, the average commercial bank’s long position in CBOT wheat 
was 4,970 contracts, second in size only to the 8,597 average for all CIT traders (see Table 4).   
 
To further compare the BP traders to the CIT.  We calculate the net position (long positions –short 
positions) for both the BP and CIT data.  As shown in Figure 8 for the corn futures market, the net 
positions of these groups are closely related.  This is generally true across all markets (not shown).  
So, it would appear that the BP traders are a representative sample or subset of the CIT data.  In the 
final column in Table 10, we calculate the percent of the CIT positions that would be held by the 
commercial banks included in the BP data.  The percent of CIT positions that are likely commercial 
banks range from a low of 18% (feeder cattle) to a high of 35% (CBOT wheat).  Because the BP 
data are futures-only and the CIT data are combined futures and options, the position sizes and 
percent of CIT open interest reported in Table 10 represent a lower bound on the estimates. 
 
The relationship between the BP data and the CIT data is important because it justifies the use of the 
BP data as a proxy for index trader activity in the period prior to 2006.  Three markets—CBOT 
wheat, corn, and soybeans—have at least some BP data available for 2003.  Any missing 
observations in 2003 and early 2004 are replaced by the positions reported in the prior month.  
Then, the banks’ percent of futures-only open interest is calculated for each market and plotted from 
2003-2008.  If the BP positions are a representative sample of the overall CIT category, then the 
general trends in the BP data can provide evidence in regards to the growth pattern of overall index 
fund activity. 
 
The percent of futures-only open interest held by the commercial banks is plotted in Figure 9.  
Immediately it is clear that the most rapid increase in index participation appears to have occurred 
prior to the start of the CIT data history (prior to 2006).  In the case of wheat, BP positions grew 
from 2% at the end of 2003 to almost 12% of the total futures open interest by May of 2005.  For all 
three of these markets, the rapid increase in bank positions—and presumably all index positions—
occurred during the 18 month period from early 2004 to mid-2005.  Over that time period, BP 
positions in corn futures climbed from less than 1% of futures-only open interest to over 6%.   
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The BP data suggest that index activity showed the greatest growth (as a percent of the market) 
from early 2004 through mid-2005.  It seems that this time period would be most prone to a market 
impact by index traders.  In fact, as shown in Figure 10 for soybeans, the peak in the absolute 
position size comes well after the peak in the percent of open interest.  This tendency is confirmed 
by looking at the actual CIT data over the 2006-2008 time period.  As shown in Figure 11, the 
absolute index position in soybeans increased steadily through 2007, while the percent of open 
interest was fairly stable at around 13%.  Likewise, for lean hogs, the absolute position size held by 
index funds increased from 40,000 contracts to over 60,000 from late 2007 into early 2008 (see 
Figure 12).  However, while there was some increase in the percent of open interest held by index 
traders, it did not exceed the 25% level seen in early 2006.  This may indicate that the market is 
doing a better job of adjusting to index trader buying.  As a result, index traders’ percent of total 
open interest is relatively stable even though their absolute position size continues to increase. 
 
The BP positions are highly correlated with those of the CIT positions; thus, the BP positions 
provide a good proxy for index trader activity prior to 2006.  The BP data suggest that index 
activity—as reflected by commercial banks—started in the grain futures markets in 2003 and grew 
rapidly from early 2004 to mid-2005.  In most markets, index traders’ percent of open interest 
peaked in early-2006, even though absolute position sizes continued to increase.   These data 
suggest that the futures market may have went through a period of adjustment as this new type of 




In assessing the policy implications of this research, it is important to consider lessons from 
comparable episodes in the past.  We submit that 1972-1975 is the last time period with comparable 
levels of structural change in commodity markets.  U.S. and international commodity markets 
experienced a period of rapid price increases from 1972-1975, setting new all-time highs across a 
broad range of markets. In hindsight, economists generally consider this a period marked by rapid 
structural shifts such as oil embargoes, Russian grain imports, and the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system (Cooper and Lawrence 1975).   
 
It is particularly interesting to note that commodity price increases over 1972-1975 were often 
blamed on speculative behavior associated with the “tremendous expansion of trading in futures in a 
wide range of commodities” (Cooper and Lawrence 1975, p. 702).  In fact, Labys and Thomas 
(1975, p. 287) motivate their research with words that could have been written in 2008 instead of 
1975: 
 
This paper analyses the instability of primary commodity prices during the recent period of 
economic upheaval, and determines the extent to which this instability was amplified by the 
substantial increase in futures speculation which also occurred.  Of particular interest is the 
degree to which this speculation rose and fell with the switch of speculative funds away from 
traditional asset placements and towards commodity futures contracts.   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Labys and Thomas found only a weak relationship between speculative 
activity and price instability.  Still, public pressure to curb speculation resulted in a number of 
regulatory proposals and the upward adjustment of margin requirements (Rainbolt 1977; Tomek   13
1985; Fishe and Goldberg 1986).  The only consistent impact of higher margin requirements seems 
to be a decline in futures trading volume.  The evidence that higher futures margins lower price 
variability is mixed, and there is no evidence that higher futures margins actually lower price levels 
(Peck and Budge 1987; Fishe and Goldberg 1986; Haradouvelis and Kim 1996).  So, while higher 
margins may have reduced speculation—through lower open interest and reduced volume of 
trade—it seems to do little to cure the “problems” of high prices or price variability. 
 
Like the 1972-1975 period, the 2006-2008 period has experienced a rapid increase in commodity 
price levels.  Demand growth from developing nations, the diversion of row crops to biofuel 
production, and U.S. monetary policy are some of the economic fundamentals thought to underlie 
recent commodity price increases (Trostle 2008).  The complex interplay between these factors and 
how they impact price expectations is often difficult to grasp in real-time.  So, much like the early 
1970’s, the scapegoat for commodity price increases seems to have become the speculator, whose 
motives are much easier to impugn.  Like spring following winter, calls are now being heard in the 
halls of the U.S. Congress for higher futures margins to curb speculation (CHSGA 2008). Given the 
potentially negative impacts of such policy decisions on the U.S. futures industry and on the proper 
functioning of the markets, it is critical to provide an objective characterization of the characteristics 
and potential impact of speculators in today’s futures markets. 
 
The present research does not directly address the impact of speculators on price behavior.  
However, it does suggest that current levels of speculation—given the markets hedging needs—are 
at historically normal levels.  Indeed, Working’s T in many agricultural futures markets are at levels 
that may have been associated with “inadequate” speculation in the past.  If this is the case, then 
policy decisions aimed at curbing speculation may well be counter-productive in terms of price 
levels and market volatility.  In particular, these policy initiatives could severely compromise the 
ability of futures markets to accommodate hedgers and facilitate the transfer of risk.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This research examines the size and activity of trader categories in the traditional Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commitments of Traders (COT) reports, the Commodity 
Index Trader (CIT) reports, and the Bank Participation (BP) reports.  The data are closely examined 
for potential shifts or changes in the trader activity.  In regards to the relative size of the index 
funds, they usually comprise between 10%-20% of the total open positions within most markets.  
However, because they are almost exclusively long, they tend to make up 20%-40% of the long-side 
of the market.  In some markets (i.e., lean hogs, CBOT wheat), index funds are the predominant 
long position holder.  The agricultural markets averaged fewer than 25 reporting long index traders 
over the 2006-2008 sample period.  However, the long index traders have average positions that are 
more than 10 times the size of the typical non-commercial trader.  For CBOT wheat, the average 
index position size exceeds the speculative limit. 
 
A few notable trends or shifts in market participation are observed in the data.  First, agricultural 
commodity futures markets have experienced a rapid increase in open interest that started in late 
2004 and continues into 2008 for many markets.  Second, from early 2005 to mid-2006 there was a 
dramatic increase in index funds’ percent of total open interest (as shown by the BP data).  For most 
markets, the index funds percent of open interest peaked in 2006 and has since stabilized, even   14
though absolute position size continues to grow.  Third, traditional speculative measures do not 
show any material changes or shifts over the sample period.  Even after adjusting speculative 
indices for index fund positions, values are within the historical ranges reported in prior research. 
 
While this analysis does not test for market impacts, it does provide some discussion points on that 
topic. First, if there is a market impact from index fund activity, it seems likely that it would have 
occurred during the period of rapid growth in 2004-2005.  Second, the stabilization of the index 
funds’ percent of total open interest may suggest that other traders have adjusted their strategies to 
better cope with this relatively new market participant.  Third, Working’s speculative index 
suggests that long-only index funds may in fact be beneficial in markets dominated by short 
hedging pressure.  That is, they improve the adequacy of speculation by helping the market to 
“carry” unbalanced short hedging.  However, the traditional notion that hedging begets speculating 
may need to be re-visited.  
 
The ability of index funds to push prices away from fundamental value is almost accepted without 
criticism within the popular press.  This notion seems unlikely given the ease with which other large 
non-commercial traders should be able to trade against index fund positions.  Index funds do not 
attempt to hide their current position or their next move.  Generally, funds that track a popular 
commodity index (e.g., GSCI) publish their mechanical procedures for rolling to new contract 
months.  Moreover, they usually indicate desired market weightings when the index is re-balanced.  
So, the only uncertainty in their trading patterns may stem from the overall in-flow or out-flow of 
monies associated with the underlying investment vehicle (e.g., mutual fund).  It seems unlikely that 
more flexible speculators would allow index funds to push prices away from fundamental values. 
 
Much like in the last major episode of structural change in commodity markets in 1972-1975, some 
are blaming speculators for the recent increase in commodity prices.  Proposals are once again 
surfacing to increase margins in an effort to curb “harmful” speculation in futures markets.  Such 
policy decisions aimed at curbing speculation may well be counter-productive in terms of price 
levels or market volatility.  In particular, these policy initiatives could severely compromise the 
ability of futures markets to accommodate hedgers and facilitate the transfer of risk.  
 
There is certainly a need for additional research on the activity and market impact of all trader 
groups, especially index traders, using more disaggregated data (e.g., daily by contract maturity).  
Indeed, early research on futures markets stressed that an understanding of the size and motivation 
of various market participants was a crucial first step in understanding other, more advanced, 
market performance issues. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Seen Hieronymus (1971), McDonald and Freund (1983), and Fenton and Martinaitas (2005) for 
extensive discussions of the history and evolution of the COT Report.  CFTC (2008) contains a 
detailed explanation of current COT reports.  
 
2 According to Hull (2000, p. 121), “A swap is an agreement between two companies to exchange 
cash flows in the future.  The agreement defines the dates when the cash flows are to be paid and 
way that they are to be calculated.  Usually the calculation of the cash flows involves the future 
values of one or more market variables.”  A cash forward contract is a simple example of a swap in 
commodities markets.   Suppose a farmer enters into a forward contract with a grain merchant today 
to deliver 10,000 bushels of soybeans on October 1, 2008 at $12 per bushel.  Since the grain 
merchant can sell the grain as soon as it is delivered by the farmer, the forward contract is 
equivalent to a “swap” agreement where the grain merchant will pay a cash flow of $120,000 on 
October 1, 2008, and in return, will receive a cash flow of 10,000 x S, where S is the spot price of 
soybeans on October 1, 2008.  Hull notes that swap agreements typically have cash flows on more 
than one date, whereas the forward contract “swap” has cash flows on a single date.  
 
3 CBOT denotes Chicago Board of Trade (now CME Group, Inc.), KCBOT denotes Kansas City 
Board of Trade, and MGEX, denotes Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 
 
4 Note that SS + HS = SL + HL must hold in a zero sum futures market if all positions are 
categorized as speculative or hedging.  If HL = 0, the identity reduces to SS + HS = SL.  Dividing 
through by HS and re-arranging yields T = SL/HS = 1 + (SS/HS). 
 
5 The 1967 Nathan Associates study reported speculative indexes in graphical form rather than 
tabular form, and hence, results from this study were not included in Table 9. 
 
6 Note that CIT adjusted speculative indexes for 2006-2008 in Table 8 allocate non-reporting 
traders’ positions to the commercial, non-commercial, and index trader categories in the same 
proportion as that which is observed for reporting traders.  Consequently, the estimates in Table 8 
fall between the reported ranges in Table 9.  
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Table 1. Percent of Open Interest Held by Trader Category, COT Reports, 1995-2008 
 















Corn  28% 47% 25%    39% 46% 15% 
Soybeans  33% 42% 25%    40% 44% 16% 
Soybean  Oil  31% 51% 18%    34% 58%  8% 
CBOT  Wheat  35% 42% 22%    42% 48% 10% 
KCBOT  Wheat  20% 55% 25%    32% 48% 20% 
Cotton  34% 53% 13%    41% 52%  7% 
Live  Cattle 30% 41% 29%    40% 44% 16% 
Feeder  Cattle  32% 24% 43%    42% 27% 32% 











Commercial  Commercial Commercial 
Market  Long Short  Spread  Long Short 
Corn  11% 0%  0% 86% 3% 
Soybeans  10% 0%  0% 87% 3% 
Soybean  Oil 7% 0% 0%  91%  2% 
CBOT  Wheat  11% 0%  0% 84% 5% 
KCBOT  Wheat  15% 0%  0% 84% 1% 
Cotton  8% 0% 0%  90%  2% 
Live  Cattle  15% 0%  0% 83% 1% 
Feeder  Cattle  36% 0%  0% 63% 1% 
















Corn  37% 36% 12% 15% 
Soybeans  38% 33% 13% 16% 
Soybean  Oil  33% 46% 12%  8% 
CBOT  Wheat 39% 29% 21% 10% 
KCBOT  Wheat  30% 40% 10% 20% 
Cotton  40% 37% 16%  7% 
Live  Cattle  37% 28% 20% 16% 
Feeder  Cattle 37% 19% 12% 32% 
Lean  Hogs  37% 26% 22% 15% 
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Corn  48% -37% 94% -19% 
Soybeans  28% -35% 94% -18% 
Soybean  Oil  46% -42% 95% 22% 
CBOT  Wheat -6% -54% 90% -25% 
KCBOT  Wheat  66% -47% 98% -11% 
Cotton  15% -47% 96% 28% 
Live  Cattle  21% -57% 97% -39% 
Feeder  Cattle  33% -20% 98% -45% 







Table 5. Percent of Long and Short Positions by COT Trader Group, 2006-2008. 
 











Corn  42% 23% 23% 12% 
Soybeans  41% 21% 25% 13% 
Soybean  Oil  39% 27% 24% 10% 
CBOT  Wheat 39% 14% 40%  8% 
KCBOT  Wheat  41% 21% 20% 18% 
Cotton  40% 20% 31%  9% 
Live  Cattle  40% 12% 39% 10% 
Feeder  Cattle 44% 16% 23% 17% 
Lean Hogs  36%  9%  44%  12% 
 










Corn 33%  49%  1%  18% 
Soybeans 36%  45%  1%  19% 
Soybean Oil  27%  66%  1%  7% 
CBOT Wheat  40%  45%  2%  13% 
KCBOT Wheat  19%  58%  0%  22% 
Cotton 39%  55%  1%  5% 
Live Cattle  34%  44%  0%  22% 
Feeder Cattle  31%  23%  0%  46% 
Lean Hogs  38%  42%  0%  19% 
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Table 6. Average Number of Reporting Traders, COT Trader Category, 2006-2008 
 
      Non-Commercial    Commercial  Index Index 
Market  Total Long Short  Spread  Long Short Long Short 
Corn  758 203 133 234 275 331  24  10 
Soybeans  463 138 111 166 113 152  24  7 
Soybean  Oil  197  64 38 55 49 57 16  3 
CBOT  Wheat  370 102 118 142  65  101  24  9 
KCBOT  Wheat  182  57 24 37 50 72 15  2 
Cotton  297  112  78 87 63 62 21  4 
Live  Cattle  328  79 68 87 80  137  23  3 
Feeder  Cattle  146  35 29 29 35 51 16  1 




Table 7. Average Position Size (contracts), COT Trader Category, 2006-2008 
 
 





Market  Long Short  Spread  Long Short Long  Short    Position  Limit
a 
Corn  1,218  644  2,062 1,422 2,542  16,805  1,176   250 22,000 
Soybeans  616 398 955  1,081  1,743  6,123  691    150  10,000 
Soybean  Oil  861  483  1123 1,647 3,527 4,550  688   200  6,500 
CBOT  Wheat  573 553 981  1,091  2,297  8,597  1,092    150  6,500 
KCBOT  Wheat 723 349 549 626  1,223  1,948  180    150  6,500 
Cotton  382 393 891 921  2,652  4,104  361    100  5,000 
Live  Cattle  566 434 722 408 864  4,569  462    100  5,150 
Feeder  Cattle  267 152 203 153 153 473  62    50 1,000 
Lean  Hogs  401 394 565 754  1,885  3,853  212    100  4,100 
aLimits for futures plus delta-adjusted options positions, all contract months combined. 
 
 














Corn  1.06 1.09 1.10 1.07 1.13 
Soybeans  1.08 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.21 
Soybean  Oil  1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.09 
CBOT  Wheat  1.13 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.31 
KCBOT  Wheat  1.05 1.05 1.09 1.09 1.14 
Cotton  1.05 1.05 1.09 1.10 1.20 
Live  Cattle 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.15 1.30 
Feeder  Cattle  1.28 1.31 1.26 1.38 1.67 
Lean  Hogs 1.23 1.15 1.13 1.16 1.39 
       
  Average  1.12 1.12 1.12 1.14 1.27 
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Corn 1.16  1.19  1.263-1.609  1.045-1.204    1.06-1.34 
Soybeans 1.28  1.31  1.329-1.946  1.061-1.310    1.10-1.45 
Soybean Oil  1.14  1.18        1.07-1.15 
CBOT Wheat  1.22  1.19  1.355-1.891  1.094-1.323    1.19-1.49 
KCBOT Wheat      1.081-1.264  1.009-1.045    1.05-1.36 
Cotton 1.27        1.16-1.27 
Live Cattle        1.568-2.173  1.05-2.34  1.13-1.60 
Feeder  Cattle        1.08-3.80  1.14-2.61 
Lean  Hogs        1.10-8.69  1.18-1.68 
           
 Average  1.21  1.22  1.26-1.68  1.155-1.411  1.08-4.94  1.12-1.55 
aWorking (1960), Table 3, p. 194.  Non-reporting traders are allocated to hedging or speculating based on the levels of 
hedging and speculating in reported positions (see Working’s technical appendix 2, p.p. 214-216) 
bLaby’s and Ganger (1970), Table 5-6, p. 127.  Non-reporting traders are allocated to hedging or speculating based on 
the levels of hedging and speculating in reported positions following the method of Working (1960). 
cPeck (1980), Table 1, p. 1039 and Table 2,  p. 1042.  Peck estimates an upper (lower) bound by assuming all non-
reporting traders are speculators (hedgers).  The date range represents the most inclusive time period over which the 
index was calculated across the markets. 
dLeuthold (1983), Table VI, p. 131.  Leuthold estimates an upper (lower) bound by assuming all non-reporting traders 
are speculators (hedgers). The date range represents the most inclusive time period over which the index was calculated 
across the markets.  





Table 10. Bank Participation Data, 2006-2008 
 
  Bank  % of Futures  Position Size  Position Size  % of CIT 
Market  Count  Open Interest  Long  Short  Open Interest 
Corn 13  5%  10,057  551  31% 
Soybeans 10  4%  3,555  259  25% 
Soybean Oil  7  4%  2,634  192  27% 
CBOT Wheat  14  9%  4,970  425  35% 
KCBOT Wheat  7  3%  1,147  22  26% 
Cotton 10  6%  2,093  56  25% 
Live Cattle  7  5%  3,333  245  25% 
Feeder  Cattle 5  2% 231 29 18% 
Lean Hogs  7  5%  2,795  20  22% 
   23
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Figure 5. Percent of Open Interest in CBOT Wheat, Corn, and Soybeans 












































































































Figure 6. Percent of Open Interest in Live Cattle, Lean Hogs and Feeder Cattle 
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Figure 9. Bank Percent of Futures Open Interest in CBOT Wheat, Corn,  
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Figure 12. CIT Participation in Lean Hogs, 2006-2008. 
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